The aim of this paper is to investigate whether price dynamics is homogeneous across the Eurozone countries. Relying on monthly data over the January 1970-July 2011 period, we test for the absolute purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis through the implementation of second-generation panel unit root and cointegration tests. Our results show that price dynamics are heterogeneous depending on both the time period and the considered group of countries. More specifically, while PPP is validated for the core EMU countries, this hypothesis does not hold for Northern peripheral economies. Turning to the Southern countries, PPP is observed only before the launch of the euro. 
are expected in peripheral countries, leading to heterogeneous convergence speeds depending on the group of countries-the extreme case being non convergence of price levels-and challenging absolute (and hence relative) PPP. In that case, common monetary policy may be inadequate because of its pro-cyclicality. On one hand, it could be too restrictive for advanced economies, and lead to deflationary pressures. On the other hand, it could be too incentive for countries experiencing a catching-up: because of negative or low real interest rates, debt bubbles may appear, conducting to worsen internal imbalances (excess leverage, asset price bubbles), and external deficits. Testing for absolute price convergence would allow us to investigate whether these processes may have materialized after the launch of the euro, partly conducting to the sovereign debt crisis.
Only a few papers deal with price convergence inside the EMU. Articles generally focus on the reasons explaining heterogeneity in inflation rates (see for example Engel and Rogers (2001) , Honohan and Lane (2003) , or Arnold and Verhoef (2004) ), but very few investigate price dynamics empirically (i.e. validation of absolute PPP), mainly because of the lack of available data. The differences between the existing studies come from the datasets used. Some rely on microdata- Engel and Rogers (2004) , Crucini et al. (2005) and Rogers (2007) -while others use aggregate data- Camarero et al. (2000) , Allington et al. (2005) , or Faber and Stockman (2009) 
Among the studies using microdata panels, Engel and Rogers (2004) and Rogers (2007) consider data from the Economic Intelligence Unit and pay attention to the price of "standard" goods measured in 18 cities belonging to the Eurozone. They find a reduction of price dispersion during the implementation of the Single Act (1986), but the introduction of the euro seems to have had little effect. Crucini et al. (2005) test the validity of LOOP (Law Of One Price) using Eurostat data for four different years (1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990) . They show that LOOP is violated only for a little numbers of products, tending to validate absolute PPP.
Studies using aggregate data provide results that go in the same direction. Camarero et al. 3 (2000) evidence a catching-up effect for peripheral countries (Spain, Italy, and UK) relative to Germany, by implementing time series unit root tests with structural breaks on CPI differentials. 2 Allington et al. (2005) , employing Comparative Price Levels (CPLs) provided by Eurostat, put forward a significant effect of the euro on price dispersion. By recalculating CPIs that account for price level differentials between countries, Faber and Stockman (2009) uphold the diminution in price dispersion across Eurozone countries. Finally, Guerreiro and Mignon (2011) highlight some heterogeneity across the Eurozone members in terms of price convergence speed, that can be explained by the evolution of price competitiveness, rigidities on the labor market and technological specialization patterns.
Our aim in this paper is to contribute to this literature that is still in its infancy by investigating the homogeneity of price dynamics inside EMU over the January 1970 to July 2011 period. We show that to respect price stability-and hence keep the monetary union viable-one of the conditions lies in the achievement of absolute PPP. Therefore, to investigate price convergence we rely on unit root and cointegration tests. We go further than the usual time series and panel tests by accounting for both heterogeneity and cross-section dependence through the implementation of second-generation panel unit root tests. We also assess speeds of price convergence using the Pooled Mean Group estimator (PMG) of Pesaran, Smith and Shin (1999) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and the data. Section 3 displays the results of unit root tests and PMG estimates, while Section 4 discusses our findings. Section 5 concludes the article.
Theoretical backgrounds and data

Theoretical backgrounds
In a two-countries model, absolute PPP is defined by:
where e t is the log of the spot exchange rate, and p t and p * t respectively denote the log of the domestic and foreign price levels. Relative PPP holds when:
with ∆e t denoting the variation of the log of the exchange rate, ∆p t and ∆p * t the inflation rates of domestic and foreign country. If we assume now that these countries form a monetary union with a single currency, e t = 0, and it comes for absolute PPP:
while relative PPP becomes:
Plugging (3) and (4), we get :
Consequently, in a monetary union, absolute and relative PPP are equivalent. In other words, convergence in inflation rates is conditioned by the fact that price levels are the same between countries. If price levels differ, the viability of the monetary area is challenged on the long run. Countries that have lower price levels are expected to catch-up their delay (BalassaSamuelson effect), leading to higher inflation rates which goes against relative PPP inside a 5 currency union. In a highly integrated currency union where trade barriers have disappeared, and assuming that the adjustment towards absolute PPP is made only through the goods market, a violation of absolute PPP "signals an imbalance in the goods markets which [...] is likely to result in trade deficits" (Juselius (2003) ). Capital inflows (thanks to borrowing) are necessary to recover the equilibrium of the balance of payments. However, these massive inflows pressure upward nominal interest rates of low price countries leading to an increase of the spreads relative to high price level countries. Accumulation of deficits also leads to an increase of the debt level which in turns raises the risk premium that traduces the default risk.
The combined effect of these two mechanisms-that reveals the mistrust to currency union viability-entails prohibitive financing rates, conducting to a sovereign debt crisis that spills over the union. This can be seen as a pure asymmetric shock as that presented by Mundell (1961) in the seminal paper on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), that challenges the existence of the currency union.
Data
To test for absolute PPP, price levels of Eurozone countries are needed. CPIs are unusable since they do not account for price level differentials between countries: they only depict the evolution of prices. 
where P P P has been chosen as the basis year because it corresponds to the year of the last ICP survey realized by the World Bank. 5 From Equation (7), we thus obtain 12 series of price levels 6 that can be used to test for price convergence (see Figure 1 in Appendix). Given the importance of Germany in the Eurozone, we retain this country as the benchmark, and investigate PPP between each domestic price level series and the German one. 7
3 Tests and estimation results
Time series analysis
To assess PPP between each Eurozone member and Germany, we rely on unit root and cointegration techniques by estimating an ADF-type equation: 8
where x t denotes the differential between domestic (P t ) and German (P * t ) prices (in logs):
When the null hypothesis φ = 0 in Equation (8) is rejected, the price differential is nonstationary, meaning that PPP does not hold. In the case where the null is rejected, it is possible to calculate the half-life of deviations (− ln(2)/ ln(1 + φ)) which provides an indication regarding the speed of price mean reversion.
As evidenced by the typology of Balassa (1961) (8) does not include a deterministic trend, the latter being non significant. *** (resp. **, *): rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) significance level. Half-lives are expressed in years. Source: Guerreiro and Mignon (2011) .
the Single Act. The latter defines the beginning of the second period, spanning from July 1987
to December 1998. The last period starts with the introduction of the euro in January 1999
and ends in July 2011. Those periods, which are distinguished here according to the integration process, are also characterized by different exchange rate regimes: a "smooth" European
Monetary System (EMS) allowing some parity adjusments for the first period; strengthening of fixed exchange rates within the EMS, with decreasing possibilities of parity adjustments and the start of a nominal convergence process to meet Maastricht criteria and to enter in the monetary union for the second period; introduction of the monetary union in the third period.
Results of cointegration tests are presented in Table 1 which displays the p-values relating to the ADF-type test 9 and the half-life of deviations (in years). With the exception of some few special cases, 10 PPP does not hold since the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between domestic and German prices. These poor results and the absence of obvious convergence may come from the well-known low power of time series unit root tests against the stationary alternative in small samples. To overcome this limitation, we rely on a panel framework. Adding the individual dimension to the analysis, the use of panel data increases the power of unit root tests by raising the number of observations. Furthermore, this approach allows us to consider both heterogeneity and cross dependence between Eurozone countries.
Panel analysis
Historically, European countries have tied links for a long time, especially since the beginning of economic integration initiated after World War II. In this context of integration, European countries have shared common specificities-one of the tremendous example being the euro, and all the domains of monetary policy. However, despite this apparent homogeneity, some heterogeneity may persist due to distinct economic characteristics across members: European construction has been done by steps, and it widens gradually incorporating new countries often considered to be less integrated to Eurozone than the founding members. Therefore, some countries known as peripheral members (like Portugal, Spain, or Greece) exhibit lower levels of GDP per capita, prices, or productivity. Assuming that Germany is at the center of our Eurozone conceptualization, we can, as Braudel (1985) , divide EMU into three sub-samples of countries: 11
• the Core EMU, composed by Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands;
• the Northern periphery, including Ireland and Finland;
• the Southern periphery made by Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
We assess potential price convergence dynamics across each sub-group using panel data unit root tests. To overcome the well-known problem of cross-sectional independence hypothesis among panel members (i.e. among the Eurozone countries), we apply second-generation panel unit root tests that relax this restrictive assumption required by first-generation tests. 12 , 13
The Pesaran (2007) CIPS and the Choi (2002) tests are performed and the corresponding results are reported in Table 2 , both tests considering the unit root as the null hypothesis. 14 The former test is based on Dickey-Fuller-type regressions augmented with the cross-section averages of lagged levels and first differences of the individual series. The later relies on an error-components panel model and removes the cross-section dependence by eliminating (i) individual effects using the Elliott et al. (1996) methodology (ERS), and (ii) the time trend effect by centering on the individual mean.
Results are relatively mixed and dependent on the test considered. The CIPS and Choi's tests frequently lead to different results. This difference may come from the way cross-sectional dependence is accounted for. Both tests are based on the one common factor approach. However, while Choi's test uses the orthogonalization procedure to deal with the cross-dependence problem, the CIPS test uses augmented cross-section average and therefore does not eliminate individual and time effects. In addition, while both tests consider one common factor, only the Choi's test allows for heterogeneous specification regarding the sensitivity of the factor, which is particularly relevant in the Eurozone macroeconomic context. Paying thus a particular attention to the Choi's approach, PPP relative to Germany is validated for both the whole sample and the core EMU in the three sub-periods. PPP also holds for Southern periphery during the first two periods, but not after the launch of the euro. Regarding Northern periphery, there are strong evidences that PPP is violated for each sub-period. On the whole, our results put forward that price dynamics is heterogeneous between EMU members. To complement these findings, we estimate the half-life of deviations from PPP for sub-groups as well as individual countries. To this end, we use the PMG estimator developed by Pesaran,
Smith and Shin (1999). This procedure consists in estimating a panel error correction model
where homogeneity accross members is imposed for the long-run relationship, 15 while heterogeneity is allowed in the short-run dynamics and error correction mechanisms. It combines two well-known procedures used in panel data: (i) the totally heterogeneous "mean group estimate", that consists in estimating separately N individuals regressions and averaging the group specific coefficients; and (ii) the homogeneous "pooled estimator", in which only the intercept is authorized to differ across Eurozone members. Tables 3 and 4 report the PMG estimates of the error-correction term and the corresponding half lives. As shown in Table 3 , the period corresponding to the implementation of the Single Act is the one for which half lives are the smallest for the whole sample (about 6 months) and for the Core EMU (about 4 months). This is in line with the literature arguing that the Single Act has allowed to fully remove the remaining trade barriers (Engel and Rogers (2004) ). This may also be linked to the requirements of nominal convergence due to the entry into the monetary union. The introduction of the euro, that was expected to accentuate this
15 This hypothesis can be tested using an Hausman-type test. Regarding individual countries (Table 4) , heterogeneity across members is even more marked.
Inside the Core, and during the first period, France exhibits the lowest half life, about 5 months, while it is about 34 months in Italy and 115 in Austria. During the second period, the differences tend to diminish, but the launch of the euro triggered a raise of gaps. One of the worrying result is the half life of Belgium in the third period, being about 68 months.
Such a value may indicate that this country is running out the cointegration path. Regarding the Southern group, departures from PPP have increased between the first and the second period, but they are relatively homogeneous between countries.
Analysis and scope of the results
Our results put forward that price dynamics is not homogeneous (i) in time, and (ii) between
European countries. Here, we aim at identifying the reasons of this heterogeneity across members, a fact that is highly relevant given that heterogeneity in price dynamics is at the roots of the sovereign debt crisis that EMU is experiencing.
Heterogeneity of price dynamics as a consequence of structural economic heterogeneity
One of the reasons explaining the differences in price dynamics is the Balassa-Samuelson catching-up effect, that entails an elevation of the aggregate price levels in the low-productivity Authors' calculation on the basis of OECD data.
level countries. It can be considered as an asymmetric shock since the high-level productivity countries are expected to experience price stability. One of the proxies often used to model this phenomenon is the relative GDP PPP per capita. Table 5 reports GDP PPP per capita relative to Germany. The 2007 value is shown to assess the effects of "subprimes" and hence "sovereign debt" crises. Regarding Southern Europe, the situations are somewhat mixed. Portugal has markedly reduced the gap relative to Germany before 1999, however it is not totally fulfilled and differences are still consequent. Moreover, the reduction is definitely stopped after 1999 with the launch of the euro. Instead, Greece seems to have experienced a catching-up after the implementation of the single currency. As
Portugal, the departure is not eliminated. Finally, Spain appears to have converged to German GDP per capita all over the period. Balassa-Samuelson catching up is then a satisfactory explanation for the PPP violation for Greece and Spain, but not for Portugal. Regarding
Northern periphery, the Balassa-Samuelson catching up is at play in Ireland and Finland for the whole period. Turning to the Core, interesting insights stand out. GDPs per capita relative to Germany have been relatively stable between periods (unless Luxembourg, that can be considered as an outlier), providing a general background for the results found in Section 3.2. The elevated half-lives obtained for Italy during all the periods can be explained by the size of the GDP gap (that is relatively higher than for the other countries belonging to the Core) relative to Germany.
Nonetheless, Balassa-Samuelson catching up is not the unique reason of asymmetric shock appearance. The nominal exchange rate level relative to the rest of the world can also constitute a factor that can lead to divergences in price dynamics. In other words, can EMU members compete with low wage countries with a strong currency if they are specialized in low technology products? Since the competitiveness of these products is highly sensitive to costs, members specialized in low technology have to pressure downward their wages, and also their price to recover competitiveness relative to low wage countries. Members that are specialized in high technology do not experience these constraints since their products are less sensitive to costs. Two different price dynamics are then at play: one pressured downward, the other unconstrained. Since the wages are not likely to decrease, members specialized in low technology will face a dramatic loss of competitiveness if they do not go up market.
We try to control for that effect by constructing a simple index of technological specialization on the basis of the revealed comparative advantages for the CITI manufacturing indicator (see Appendix for the construction of the index). Table 6 reports the technological specialization for each country during the periods 1987-1998 and 1999-2009 . Four categories of countries can be distinguished:
• Our benchmark country, Germany is specialized in industries with high technological contents: its products are innovative, or positioned on the high quality segment, which allows it to discriminate its prices.
• Austria, Finland, France, and the Netherlands own at equal shares high and medium technology industries. They have a lower market power than Germany, even if it remains substantial.
• Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Spain are mainly specialized in medium-technology sectors,
and have very few high-tech industries. Moreover, low-technology sectors represent an important part of specialization in Spain and Italy.
• Greece and Portugal are mostly specialized in low-technology industries, facing a strong competition in prices.
The heterogeneity of specialization supplemented by rigidities in wage decrease, may explain the non-convergence of Southern countries, especially Portugal, and also the elevated half-lives of Belgium and Italy: without the possibility of decreasing wages (and hence prices), a strong currency induces a loss of competitiveness that translates into imbalances in goods markets, and finally a violation of PPP.
Scope of the results
To our best knowledge, with the exception of Cecchetti et al. (2002) , no study exists on the PPP deviation inside a monetary area. Cecchetti et al. (2002) have tested price index convergence among US cities using first generation panel unit root tests. Comparing our results with theirs may be interesting because the US is a long-lived monetary area, with strong political links and where economic integration is entire. Although Cecchetti et al. (2002) find, as we do, price convergence between US cities (i.e. validation of the PPP hypothesis), their half-lives are far higher than ours. They are comprised between eight and nine years for their whole sample (19 cities on the 1918 to 1995 period), and about eight years for the more recent period (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) . Such results would mean that EMU is more integrated than the US, which is unlikely. The more plausible explanation lies in the data used as well as the econometric techniques that have been implemented. Cecchetti et al. (2002) consider price indexes instead of price levels, which is not appropriate for testing absolute PPP. Moreover, first generation panel unit root tests may have been too restrictive to assess price convergence since they assume homogeneity between members, an hypothesis that is not verified as seen in the previous section.
The recent literature on OCA has mainly devoted attention to cyclical rather than structural homogeneity of the countries considered. On one hand, an empirical strand tried to assess the correlation of business cycles and the symmetry of shocks through VARs (see Eichengreen (1992, 1996) among others). On the other hand, a theoretical strand focused on the means of rendering business cycles and shocks more symmetric (the endogenous criteria literature, pioneered by Frankel and Rose (1998) ). Our approach revives the pioneering phase of OCA literature (Mundell (1961) , McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) ) that emphasized on the structural similarities of currency union members, and stresses that these criteria may be the most important to achieved the optimality, or at least the viability, of a monetary union. Following Juselius (1995) , linking PPP (goods market) and uncovered interest parity (capital market) conditions, it is possible to understand through price dynamics why structural heterogeneity among members of a currency union is a problem. In the absence of trade barriers as well as exchange rate adjustments, a violation of PPP (such a Balassa-Samuelson catching-up, but not only) leads immediately to goods market imbalances (trade deficits) that have to be compensated by capital inflows. This creates asymmetric debt emissions between members that results in fine (through long interest rates and default probability differentials) in sovereign debt crisis from part of the members. This mechanism seems to fit the troubles EMU is experiencing. 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 LCPL_SPA 21 Note that index 23 has a high technology industry, that of nuclear, in which only France is specialized. Accordingly, we consider that for France index 23 testifies a high technology specialization. In Table 8 , we report for the two sub-periods the sectors in which countries are specialized. 
